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Abstract
This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power
Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues
that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring
voting power can be replaced by just three simple probabilities. The
framework is sufficiently general to be applicable to every conceivable
type of voting game, and every possible decision rule.
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1 Introduction
We are all familiar with the idea of voting. It affects every part of our lives,
from village committees deciding trivial matters, to the boardroom opting for
redundancies, and even government cabinets choosing a path to war. Clearly,
everyone, everywhere, is subject to the decisions made, or not made, by voting
games. Arguably, they are the most important, and influential, type of game
studied by game theorists. Despite this, there is one aspect of voting games
which is poorly understood. Namely, how to go about constructing a democrat-
ically fair voting game.
The recent events dubbed the “Arab Spring” highlight how strongly ordinary
people can feel about democracy. Even in those societies, for which, some have
claimed, democracy is an alien concept, we find those that are prepared to lay
down their lives in its pursuit. Despite their fervent ardour for democracy, it is
not entirely clear what a good democracy is, or how one would go about creating
such a thing.
However, the one thing we can all agree upon is that a democracy that
doesn’t treat all of its citizens equally is no democracy at all. As such, many
would argue that fairness is one of the founding principles of any modern democ-
racy, the idea of equal representation for all. In other words, everyone must have
the same equal ability to influence the outcome of a political decision. We will
term this ability the ‘Voting Power’ of a voter.
How do you go about measuring this voting power? The importance of this
question has motivated a number of researchers to devise quantitative measures
of fairness in election systems. The first paper on voting power was written from
a statistical perspective by [15], unfortunately this paper was largely ignored.
Later on, [17] proposed a game theoretic method for measuring the a priori
power of a voter. In contrast to both of these approaches, we have decided to
take a measure theoretic approach to voting power. Our reasoning is simple.
We aim to unify the many different strands of voting power research, with one,
all encompassing, methodology. The measure theoretic analysis is applicable to
every type of voting game, with every type of voting rule, from simple “yes/no”
majority voting, to multi-candidate games with voter abstentions. The key re-
sult we will produce is the exciting revelation that the many different techniques
can be replaced by just three fundamental probabilities.
The paper is structured as follows. We first propose an intuitive and statisti-
cal interpretation of voter influence, and show that it can be expressed using just
three elementary probabilities. We then flesh out the concept of influence by
defining events in which the voter is critical to the outcome of the election. We
then show that these events, which we call critical events, are at the heart of all
voting power techniques. Having expressed voting power as functions of critical
events, we then use measure theory to compute the probabilities of these events,
and thus are able to provide, for the first time, a probabilistic representation of
the existing voting power techniques. This allows us to see exactly what these
techniques measure, and how the various techniques relate to one-another. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our work.
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2 A Brief History of Voting Power
In a national referendum, giving everyone the same voting power is achieved by
following the principle of ‘one person, one vote’. If all decisions were made by
national referendum, this would suffice to ensure fairness. However, in many
countries we elect and appoint representatives to collectively make decisions on
our behalf. We do not vote upon every new law or budget proposal. For con-
stituencies of unequal size, we are faced with the problem of finding a voting
weight that adheres to our guiding principles of fairness. Perhaps we should
make the voting weight of a representative directly proportional to the popula-
tion they represent?
Unfortunately, the voting power of a representative is not proportional to
their voting weight, as was demonstrated in the seminal work by [1], and repro-
duced in the following table.
Representative Population No. of Weighted Votes Relative Voting Power
A 40,000 4 7
B 20,000 2 1
C 10,000 1 1
D 10,000 1 1
E 10,000 1 1
One can see that representative A, along with any other single representa-
tive can combine to make a majority. Furthermore, there is only one winning
coalition that doesn’t include representative A (coalition BCDE). Thus, using
only intuitive argument, and without recourse to voting power theory, it be-
comes apparent that representative A has considerably more voting power than
everyone else, and that the others must share the same minimal voting power.
With their publication, [17] presented a method for calculating voting power,
loosely based upon assigning a value to a winning coalition, and then distributing
that value among those within it. Other interpretations of voting power have
also been proposed, namely [1], [2], [5], and [10]. [18, 19, 20] realised that
many of these techniques were, in fact, measuring the same thing, albeit with
different underlying probability models. He even proposed that the Banzhaf
and Shapley-Shubik techniques were equivalent. (However, we will later show
that the Banzhaf measure and the Shapley-Shubik index are inequivalent, one
being a measure of Total Criticality, and the other being a measure of Increasing
Criticality - the different types of criticality are discussed in Section 6.2).
Despite having a plethora of different techniques to calculate voting power
there remain a number of challenges. First, the different techniques can give
wildly different results for the same game, making it difficult to know which
one to trust [18]. Second, these techniques are often restricted to games with
binary voting choices (“yes” or “no”), and do not account for abstentions. And
third, all the techniques make an implicit assumption about the probability
distribution of the voters, making them impossible to use in a game with a
different probability model. As a consequence, there does not appear to be a
universally accepted method of measuring fairness in election systems.
The starting point for many of the proposed indices was a set of “intuitive
notions” of what constitutes voting power. Unsurprisingly, basing a subject
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upon intuitive notions, instead of axiomatic principles, has led to a debate over
which technique is best [1, 10, 11, 6, 7, 12, 14, 13].
The current debate about voting power techniques is reminiscent of the early
history of Artificial Neural Networks. Developed using biological considerations,
there was much debate over what they could classify, and how they could be
parameterised. Only when they were placed on a common mathematical footing,
and shown to be function approximators [3, 9], did the debate end. Similarly, in
our considered opinion, existing ways of quantifying voting power are black box
techniques, derived on the basis of a restricted and subjective set of dictums.
They were not derived from first principles, and so little is known about their
validity. This leaves all analysis using these techniques open to debate.
Just as the artificial neural network debate was silenced by showing that
they are all function approximators, we hope to end the debate within voting
power by showing that all the existing techniques are simple probabilities. And
to that end, we approach the subject afresh from basic principles.
3 A Intuitive Approach to Voting Power
Ask a doctor if you should give up smoking, and they will tell you that smoking
increases your chance of dying from lung cancer by, say, 40%. This example
underlines the fact that probabilistic statements are commonplace within soci-
ety. And, more to the point, we are all familiar with the notion of measuring
influence using the probability of an outcome conditioned on a controlling fac-
tor. (In this case, the outcome is death, and the probability is conditioned on
smoking).
As we are concerned with voting games, we are interested in two separate
notions of influence: how much can a player (voter) increase the likelihood of
the outcome, and how much can a player decrease the likelihood? We can define
our intuitive notions of influence as follows.
The ability of a player i to positively influence the outcome is,
Pr(Outcome | player i does all to ensure the outcome)− Pr(Outcome). (1)
And the ability of a player i to negatively influence the outcome is,
Pr(Outcome)− Pr(Outcome | player i does all to prevent the outcome). (2)
On the basis of both negative and positive measures of influence, we argue
that the total amount of influence a player i has, with respect to a specific
outcome O, is given by the sum of these two expressions, i.e.
Pr(O | player i does all to ensure O)− Pr(O | player i does all to prevent O).
(3)
The above probability statements are very intuitive and basic notions of
influence. They can be easily understood by the general population, as prob-
abilities are fairly standard in every-day life. Thus, a probabilistic measure of
voting power is both desirable, and arguably, essential.
We strongly believe that voting power analysis should be carried out using
these probabilities. As the increased transparency of probabilities compares
favourably to the opaqueness of the currently used standard techniques. This
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can only help the subject matter be more widely accepted, and ultimately lead
to better democracies. In order to encourage this we will show, in Section 8,
that all of the standard techniques are calculating expressions (1), (2) and (3).
4 Criticality
The influence of a player on a game’s outcome can, in some sense, be measured
by the ability of the player to change the outcome. In which case, we talk about
a player being critical to the outcome.
Consider a game with eleven players and a simple majority decision rule.
On a particular issue, player i is in favour, and the motion is passed 8 − 3. If
player i were to change its mind, and vote against, the motion will still pass
7−4. Clearly i is not critical in this scenario, it has no influence on the eventual
outcome. Now consider a different situation in which player i votes in favour,
and the motion is passed 6 − 5. If player i were to change its mind, and vote
against, the motion will be rejected 5 − 6. Clearly i is critical in this scenario.
It has considerable influence on the eventual outcome.
In a game in which a player can only vote “yes” or “no”, a player i can
be critical in two distinct ways. It can be critical by increasing its support,
i.e. it joins a losing coalition to make it winning. Alternatively, it can can
be critical by decreasing its support, i.e. it leaves a winning coalition to make
it losing. We refer to these scenarios as increasing criticality and decreasing
criticality, respectively. The total influence a player can have on the outcome is
the combination of both criticalities, which we term total criticality.
There is one further concept which we briefly describe here, and rigorously
define later in section 6.2, it is the idea of criticality assumptions. These critical-
ity assumptions are needed in games where players have more than two choices,
and allow us to extend our analysis to more general settings. If we assume that
a player is either initially voting “no”, or finally voting “no”, then we term
this Criticality 0. Alternatively, if we make no assumption as to how a player
will initially, or finally, vote, then we term this Criticality δ. The combination
of the different criticalities and criticality assumptions leads to the notions of
criticality as listed in the following table.
Increasing Decreasing Total
Criticality 0
Increasing Decreasing Total
Criticality 0 (IC0) Criticality 0 (DC0) Criticality 0 (TC0)
Criticality δ
Increasing Decreasing Total
Criticality δ (ICδ) Criticality δ (DCδ) Criticality δ (TCδ)
A more in-depth, and intuitive discussion of criticality can be found in [4].
5 Criticality and Standard Voting Power Tech-
niques
The concept of criticality, as we will now demonstrate, is at the very heart of all
voting power techniques. In fact, the standard techniques used for measuring
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voting power can be viewed as simply counting the number of voting scenarios
in which a player is considered critical.
Without doubt, the two most widely used voting power techniques are the
Banzhaf measure, and the Shapley-Shubik index. In this section we will examine
these techniques in greater detail, along with a selection of other less widely used
techniques. All these techniques were originally proposed for a small subset of
voting games in which every player must vote “yes” or “no”, there is no concept
of abstention. Likewise, there are only two possible outcomes to the game, either
winning, or losing.
5.1 Shapley-Shubik Technique
[17] state that the power of an individual member of a legislative body depends
on the chance they have of being critical to the success of a winning coalition.
They explain that a voter can be “pivotal” when they can turn a possible defeat
into a success. And they construct their index as follows:
1. There are a group of individuals all willing to vote for some bill.
2. They vote in order.
3. As soon as a majority has voted for it, it is declared passed.
4. The (pivotal) member who voted last is given credit for passing the bill.
The voting orders are chosen randomly, and they calculate the number of
times that a voter is considered pivotal. The final Shapley-Shubik index is
produced by dividing the pivotal count by the total number of voting orders
(i.e. n!, where n is the number of voters). They describe this as the frequency
with which a particular voter is considered pivotal.
For a moment, let’s examine their term pivotal. It requires a losing voting
scenario in which the voter expresses zero support towards the bill to become
winning when they increase their support. Rather than call the voter pivotal,
let’s call it critical instead. Furthermore, as the voter becomes critical by in-
creasing its support, let’s call it increasingly critical. Finally, as the pivotal
voter always starts off by expressing zero support for the bill, it should be
called increasing criticality zero. Hence, the Shapley-Shubik index is given by
the following algorithm.
1. Examine every possible voting order.
2. For each voting order identify if it is increasing criticality zero for the
given voter.
3. If so, add 1 to a running count for the given voter.
4. Repeat until all voting orders have been examined, then divide by n!.
It is explicit within the construction of the Shapley-Shubik index that all
voting orders are equiprobable, the term 1
n!
is the probability of a given voting
order arising. With this is mind, it is easy to see that the Shapley-Shubik index
is nothing more than the probability of a voter being increasing criticality zero.
If we use the symbol ω to represent a voting order, then,
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ShapleyShubik =
∫
ω
I
IC0(ω) Pr(dω) = Pr(IC0),
where
I
IC0(ω) =
{
1 if ω is increasing criticality zero for the given voter;
0 otherwise.
5.2 Banzhaf Technique
[1] states that power in a legislative sense is the ability to affect outcomes.
He says specifically the power of a legislator is given by the number of possible
voting combinations of the entire legislature in which the legislator can alter the
outcome by changing their vote.
We can interpret the ability to alter the outcome through a change of vote
as follows: a voter is able to make a losing outcome winning by increasing their
support (increasing criticality), or a voter is able to make a winning outcome
losing by decreasing their support (decreasing criticality). The combination
of increasing and decreasing criticality is called total criticality. Furthermore,
as Banzhaf makes no specific requirement for the voter to be initially voting
one way or the other, let’s call this total criticality delta. Hence the Banzhaf
measure of power is given by the following algorithm.
1. Examine every possible voting combination.
2. For each voting combination identify if it is total criticality delta for the
given voter.
3. If so, add 1 to a running count for the given voter.
4. Repeat until all voting combinations have been examined, then divide by
2n.
Banzhaf assumes that every voting combination is equiprobable, the term 1
2n
is the probability of a given voting combination arising (where n is the number
of players). With this is mind, it is easy to see that the Banzhaf measure is
nothing more than the probability of a voter being total criticality delta. If we
use the symbol ω to represent a voting combination, then,
Banzhaf =
∫
ω
I
TCδ(ω) Pr(dω) = Pr(TCδ).
Where,
I
TCδ (ω) =
{
1 if ω is total criticality delta for the given voter;
0 otherwise.
5.3 Straffin
[18] proposed two different techniques differentiated by the probability model
assumed. The Independence Assumption technique uses a uniform probabil-
ity distribution, while the Homogeneity Assumption technique assumes all the
players vote in favour with the same probability p ∈ [0, 1].
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Straffin defines his measure as the probability that player i’s vote will make a
difference in the outcome. Making it, like Banzhaf, a measure of total criticality.
And, as there is no requirement for player i to be initially voting one way or
another, it is a measure of total criticality delta.
Straffin =
∫
ω
I
TCδ (ω) Pr(dω) = Pr(TCδ).
Both the Independence Assumption technique, and the Homogeneity As-
sumption technique are given by Pr(TCδ). The different probability models are
absorbed by the Pr(dω) term.
5.4 Coleman
Of all the researchers working in the field of voting power theory, [2] was per-
haps the first to appreciate the subtle differences that exist between increasing
and decreasing criticality (while [17] understood it was possible to be decreas-
ingly critical, they did not appreciate that this was materially different to being
increasingly critical). He defined two measures of power, the power to initiate
action, and the power to prevent action.
The initiate action measure is a count of the number of times a player can
be critical given the coalition is losing. Hence, it is a measure of increasing
criticality conditioned on a coalition being losing. If we let WIN represent
the set of losing coalitions, and λWIN be the sigma finite marginal measure on
WIN , then:
Coleman Initiate Action =
∫
ω∈WIN
I
ICδ (ω) λWIN (dω) = Pr(IC
δ|WIN).
The prevent action measure is a count of the number of times a player can
be critical given the coalition is winning. Hence, it is a measure of decreasing
criticality conditioned on a coalition being winning. If we let WIN represent
the set of winning coalitions, and λWIN be the sigma finite marginal measure
on WIN , then:
Coleman Prevent Action =
∫
ω∈WIN
I
DCδ (ω) λWIN (dω) = Pr(DC
δ|WIN).
5.5 Johnston
The [10] index can be described as follows. Examine every winning coalition,
identify those members which can destroy the coalition and allocate a point,
or fraction of a point, to them. In other words, this is a measure of decreasing
criticality. From his paper, it seems reasonable to assume that his index requires
the player to express zero approval in order to destroy the coalition, so we will
call it a decreasing criticality zero measure.
Johnston =
∫
ω
I
DC0(ω) Pr(dω) = Pr(DC0).
Both the original version of the Johnston index (where one point is added
for every destroyable coalition), and the modified version (where a fraction of
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a point is added) are given by Pr(DC0). In the modified version, the fraction
that is added is a function of ωN only, hence it can be absorbed within the
Pr(dω) term. Ergo, the modified version is the same as the original version,
albeit with a different probability model. The actual fraction that is added is
inversely proportional to the number of players that express full support in ωN .
Hence, the probability model of the modified index implies that coalitions with
more players expressing full support are less likely to occur.
5.6 Summary
This section examined several of the most popular voting power techniques (a
discussion of the Deegan-Packel and the Holler Public Good index is left until
Appendix A). A fundamental flaw inherent in all these techniques is their de-
pendency upon a specific probability model. Which makes it almost impossible
to use these techniques in a game with a different probability distribution. How-
ever, this failing is easily overcome by using our measure theoretic interpretation
instead, as it is defined independent of the underlying probability distribution.
Any voting power technique that can be calculated by an algorithm which
iterates through a set of voting scenarios, testing each one in turn to see if they
are critical, can be expressed within our framework. In a sense, the standard
techniques are just specific instances of our general measure theoretic approach.
This is a fundamental point, because it means that any such voting power
technique is subject to the analysis and results given in this paper. We are not
aware of any voting power technique for which our results do not apply.
6 Basic Definitions
Rather than restrict our analysis to a specific voting system, we will introduce
here the concept of a generalised voting game. This generalised voting game
encompasses all possible voting games of interest, in that it allows for any voting
rule, any number of possible voting outcomes, and any probability distribution
of the players. The definitions of probability and product spaces are taken
from [16].
6.1 Voting Games
Definition 6.1. A player is a probability space (Xi,Ai,Pi), where Xi is a set,
Ai is a sigma-field of subsets of Xi, and Pi is a countably additive, nonnegative
measure with Pi(Xi) = 1. Given a set of N players, where |N | = n, the set of
all ordered n-tuples (x1, . . . , xn), with xj ∈ Xj for each j ∈ 1, . . . n is denoted as
X1 × · · · × Xn and abbreviated to Ω
N . Given a player i, the set of all ordered
(n− 1)-tuples (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, xn), with xj ∈ Xj for each j ∈ 1, . . . , i− 1, i+
1, . . . n is denoted as X1×· · ·×Xi−1×Xi+1×· · ·×Xn and abbreviated to ΩN\{i}.
The action of creating a single (n − 1)-tuple, denoted as ωN\{i}, from a single
n-tuple ωN by removing the element xi is represented as ω
N \xi. The action of
creating a single n-tuple, denoted as ωN , from a single (n − 1)-tuple ωN\{i} by
adding an element xi ∈ Xi is represented as ωN\{i} × xi.
(When there is no risk of confusion the superscript will be dropped from the
set Ω).
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The key concepts from the previous definition are: a player i can vote by
expressing one of {xi} ∈ Xi, ωN represents a voting configuration (an event)
with |N | players, ωN \ {xi} represents a voting configuration with player i
removed, and ωN\{i} × {xi} represents a voting configuration in which player i
has joined by expressing {xi}.
Definition 6.2. Given a set of N players, where |N | = n, a set of the form
A1 × · · · × An = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X1 × · · · × Xn : xi ∈ Ai for each i}, with
Ai ∈ Ai for each i, is called a measurable rectangle. The product sigma field
A1 × · · · × An on X1 × · · · × Xn is defined to be the sigma field generated by all
measurable rectangles. Let the product space (X1 × · · · × Xn,A1 × · · · × An) be
denoted as (Ω,F).
Definition 6.3. A generalised voting game is a quadruple (Ω,F ,P,W) such
that (Ω,F ,P) is the product space generated by a set of N players, P is the
product measure, and W is a F \ O measurable function, where the elements
O ∈ O are called outcomes. Such a game is denoted as a GVG(Ω,F ,P,W).
Before moving forward it might be useful to examine the definition of a GV G
in greater detail. First, lets take a closer look at the players. Each one is defined
as a probability space, beyond this there is no further restriction. As such, it
can model every possible way of voting, from simple “yes/no” with abstentions,
to a selection from a continuous set. Furthermore, there is no requirement for
any kind of ordering to exist on the set of possible player actions.
Now let’s examine the voting rule, which is defined by the measurable func-
tionW . Beyond the requirement of measurability there is no further restriction.
Hence, it encompasses every possible mapping from the set of possible voting
configurations to the set of possible outcomes. This includes, simple pass/reject
outcomes, to a collective full ranking of preference across multi-candidate out-
comes.
We believe that this generalised definition of a voting game encompasses
every conceivable real life voting game that one could possibly wish to analyse.
6.2 Criticality
Along with the generalised definition of a voting game we have just introduced,
we require a generalised definition of criticality.
6.2.1 Criticality Sets
Definition 6.4. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W), a player i is increasingly criti-
cal with respect to an outcome O ∈ O in an event ωN ∈ ΩN if, and only if,
W(ωN ) 6= O and there exists an {x′i} ∈ Xi such thatW((ω
N \{xi})×{x′i}) = O.
Let O ICi denote the set of increasingly critical events for a player i with respect
to an outcome O.
Definition 6.5. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W), a player i is decreasingly criti-
cal with respect to an outcome O ∈ O in an event ωN ∈ ΩN if, and only if,
W(ωN ) = O and there exists an {x′i} ∈ Xi such thatW((ω
N \{xi})×{x′i}) 6= O.
Let O DCi denote the set of decreasingly critical events for a player i with re-
spect to an outcome O.
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Definition 6.6. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W), a player i is totally critical with
respect to an outcome O ∈ O in an event ωN ∈ ΩN if it is either increasingly
critical or decreasingly critical, with respect to the aforementioned outcome and
event. Let O TCi denote the set of totally critical events for a player i with
respect to an outcome O. For any given event ωN , it is not possible to be
simultaneously both increasingly and decreasingly critical with respect to a given
outcome O, therefore (O ICi ∩O DCi) = ∅.
Increasing Criticality measures a player’s ability to create the outcome they
want, while Decreasing Criticality measures their ability to prevent an outcome
they don’t want. Total Criticality, as the combination of Increasing and Decreas-
ing Criticality, is a measure of a player’s total ability to influence an outcome
of the game.
In simple “yes/no” voting games, there is a bijection between the Increas-
ing Criticality and the Decreasing Criticality events. However, if any of the
players are allowed to abstain, this symmetry can be broken, making it vital to
understand which criticality is being measured.
6.3 Criticality Assumptions
Definitions 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 measure criticality with respect to two events for a
given player i. Criticality assumptions place restrictions on player i, governing
how it can change its vote between these two events.
Definition 6.7. Criticality δ - With this assumption there is no restriction on
how player i can vote between the two different events that define it as critical.
The set of criticality δ increasingly critical events for player i, with respect to an
outcome O, is denoted by O ICδi , and the set of criticality δ decreasingly critical
events for player i, with respect to an outcome O, is denoted by O DCδi .
Criticality δ is suitable for every type of game, whereas Criticality 0 (see
below) is more appropriate for games in which there is an element of cost, or
risk, involved in supporting a decision.
Definition 6.8. Criticality 0 - With this assumption one of the two events
that define player i as being critical must have player i voting with its lowest
possible support for outcome O. The set of criticality 0 increasingly critical
events for player i, with respect to an outcome O, is denoted by O IC0i , and
the set of criticality 0 decreasingly critical events for player i, with respect to an
outcome O, is denoted by O DC0i .
In simple “yes/no” voting games Criticality 0 and Criticality δ are equivalent.
However, if any of the players are allowed to abstain this equivalence will be
lost, and it will be necessary to understand which criticality assumption is being
measured.
6.4 xOmax
i
and x
Omin
i
The final piece of notation required before the analysis can begin in earnest is a
definition of the elements xOmaxi and x
Omin
i . They are the generalised equivalents
of voting “yes” and “no” in a traditional voting game.
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Definition 6.9. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W), a player i, and an outcome O ∈ O,
let IO : ΩN → {{0}, {1}} be the indicator function that an event ωN is classified
as outcome O, i.e. when W(ωN ) = O. Then, given an ωN\{i} ∈ ΩN\{i}, define
{xOmaxi } such that for all xi ∈ Xi,
I
O
(
ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }
)
≥ IO
(
ωN\{i} × xi
)
.
Likewise, define {xOmini } such that for all xi ∈ Xi,
I
O
(
ωN\{i} × {xOmini }
)
≤ IO
(
ωN\{i} × xi
)
.
Clearly xOmini and x
Omax
i need not be unique elements within Xi, and could
instead be subsets. Should this turn out to be the case, the elements {xOmini }
and {xOmaxi } can be taken as any appropriate element within said subsets.
7 AMeasure Theoretic Analysis of Voting Power
In this section we will analyse the different notions of criticality as they are
applied in the generalised voting game. This will allow us to create an all en-
compassing framework for measuring voting power. Given that the standard
techniques we introduced in Section 5 are nothing more than examples of criti-
cality analysis in specific instances of our generalised voting game, it naturally
follows that the results we present here include, as specific instances, the stan-
dard techniques.
In Section 5 we expressed each of the techniques as an integral of a criticality
based indicator function. In order to carry out these integrations we will require
the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W), a player i, and any integrable function f ,
∫
ωN∈ΩN
f(ωN) P(dωN ) =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
∫
xi∈Xi
f(ωN) µωN\{i}(dxi) λ(dω
N\{i}).
where P is the sigma finite measure on the probability space ΩN , λ is the
sigma finite marginal measure on ΩN\{i}, and µωN\{i} is the sigma finite marginal
measure on Xi, given ωN\{i}.
Proof. This follows from Definition 6.3 with the realisation that (Ω,F ,P) is the
product space made up of the individual players, and a subsequent application
of Fubini’s Theorem.
7.1 Criticality δ
Lemma 7.2. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O DCδi ) = Pr(O) − Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
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Proof. Let ωN\{i} = ωN \ xi, then by Definitions 6.5, 6.7 and 6.9, the indicator
function IO DC
δ
i : ΩN → {{0}, {1}} for the set O DCδi is given by,
I
O DCδ
i (ωN ) =
{
1 if W(ωN ) = O and W(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) 6= O;
0 otherwise.
I
O DCδ
i can be expressed as follows, where IO is the indicator function for
the event being classified as outcome O,
I
O DCδ
i = IO(ωN )− IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }). (4)
Integrating IO DC
δ
i over all the events in the GV G creates the expectation
of the random variable EIO DC
δ
i , which we can interpret as the probability of
an event ωN being in the set O DCδi .
Pr(O DCδi ) =
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN ) − IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) P(dω
N ).
Pr(O DCδi ) =
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN ) P(dωN)
−
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) P(dω
N ).
Pr(O DCδi ) = I1− I2. (5)
Here, I1 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, which we can inter-
pret as the probability of an event ωN being in the set O.
I1 = Pr(O). (6)
Using Lemma 7.1, I2 can be expressed as,
I2 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
∫
xi∈Xi
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) µωN\{i}(dxi) λ(dω
N\{i}).
The term IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) is constant with respect to xi, therefore it
can be brought outside of the inner integral to give,
I2 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini })
∫
xi∈Xi
µωN\{i}(dxi) λ(dω
N\{i}).
I2 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) λ(dω
N\{i}).
The construction of the product space (Ω,F ,P) ensures,
λ(dωN\{i}) = λ
x
Omin
i
(dωN\{i}).
Therefore I2 can be expressed as,
I2 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) λxOmin
i
(dωN\{i}).
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I2 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, given player i has expressed
{xOmini }. Hence,
I2 = Pr(O|{xOmini }). (7)
Substituting Equations (6) and (7) in Equation (5) yields the result.
Lemma 7.3. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O ICδi ) = Pr(O|{x
Omax
i })− Pr(O).
Proof. Let ωN\{i} = ωN \ xi, then by Definitions 6.4, 6.7 and 6.9, the indicator
function IO IC
δ
i : ΩN → {0, 1} for the set O ICδi is given by,
I
O ICδ
i (ωN ) =
{
1 if W(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) = O and W(ω
N ) 6= O;
0 otherwise.
I
O ICδ
i can be expressed as follows, where IO is the indicator function for the
event being classified as outcome O,
I
O ICδ
i = IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi })− I
O(ωN ). (8)
Integrating IO IC
δ
i over all the events in the GV G creates the expectation of
the random variable EIO IC
δ
i , which we can interpret as the probability of an
event ωN being in the set O ICδi .
Pr(O ICδi ) =
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) − I
O(ωN ) P(dωN ).
Pr(O ICδi ) =
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) P(dω
N )
−
∫
ωN∈ΩN
I
O(ωN ) P(dωN ).
Pr(O ICδi ) = I1− I2. (9)
Here, I2 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, which we can inter-
pret as the probability of an event ωN being in the set O.
I2 = Pr(O). (10)
Using Lemma 7.1, I1 can be expressed as follows,
I1 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
∫
xi∈Xi
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) µωN\{i}(dxi) λ(dω
N\{i}).
The term IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) is constant with respect to xi, therefore it
can be brought outside of the inner integral to give,
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I1 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi })
∫
xi∈Xi
µωN\{i}(dxi) λ(dω
N\{i}).
I1 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) λ(dω
N\{i}).
The construction of the product space (Ω,F ,P) ensures,
λ(dωN\{i}) = λ
x
Omax
i
(dωN\{i}).
Therefore I1 can be expressed as,
I1 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) λxOmax
i
(dωN\{i}).
I1 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, given player i has expressed
{xOmaxi }. Hence,
I1 = Pr(O|{xOmaxi }). (11)
Substituting Equations (10) and (11) in Equation (9) yields the result.
Corollary 7.4. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O TCδi ) = Pr(O|{x
Omax
i })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
Proof. By Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3,
Pr(O DCδi ) = Pr(O) − Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }). (12)
Pr(O ICδi ) = Pr(O|{x
Omax
i })− Pr(O). (13)
By Definition 6.6,
Pr(O TCδi ) = Pr(O DC
δ
i ) + Pr(O IC
δ
i ). (14)
Substituting Equations (12) and (13) in Equation (14) yields the result.
7.2 Criticality 0
This section provides the results for the more specialised criticality 0.
Lemma 7.5. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O DC0i ) = Pr(O)− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
Proof. Let ωN\{i} = ωN \ xi, then by Definitions 6.5, 6.8 and 6.9, the indicator
function IO DC
0
i : ΩN → {0, 1} for the set O DC0i is given by,
I
O DC0
i (ωN ) =
{
1 if W(ωN ) = O and W(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) 6= O;
0 otherwise.
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I
O DC0
i can be expressed as follows, where IO is the indicator function for
the event being classified as outcome O,
I
O DC0
i = IO(ωN)− IO(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }). (15)
Comparing Equations (15) and (4) gives,
I
O DC0
i = IO DC
δ
i .
Therefore,
Pr(O DC0i ) = Pr(O DC
δ
i ). (16)
And hence, an application of Lemma 7.2 yields the result.
Lemma 7.6. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O IC0i |{x
Omin
i }) = Pr(O|{x
Omax
i })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
Proof. Let ωN\{i} = ωN \ xi, then by Definitions 6.4, 6.8 and 6.9, the indicator
function IO IC
0
i : ΩN → {0, 1} for the set O IC0i is given by,
I
O IC0
i (ωN) =


1 if {xi} = {x
Omin
i }, W(ω
N) 6= O,
and W(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) = O;
0 otherwise.
Let I{x
Omin
i
} be the indicator function for {xi} = {x
Omin
i }, and let I
O be
the indicator function for an event ωN being classified as outcome O, then the
indicator function IO IC
0
i can be expressed as,
I
O IC0
i (ωN ) = I{x
Omin
i
}
(
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi })− I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini })
)
. (17)
Integrating Equation (17) with respect to the sigma finite marginal measure
λ
x
Omin
i
produces the conditional expectation of the random variable EIO IC
0
i
given player i has expressed {xOmini }, which we interpret as Pr(O IC
0
i |{x
Omin
i }).
As an added bonus, it also allows the removal of the I{x
Omin
i
} indicator function.
Pr(O IC0i |{x
Omin
i }) =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i}×{xOmaxi })−I
O(ωN\{i}×{xOmini })λxOmin
i
(dωN\{i}).
(18)
The integral in Equation (18) can be split to give,
Pr(O IC0i |{x
Omin
i }) =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) λxOmin
i
(dωN\{i}),
−
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmini }) λxOmin
i
(dωN\{i}).
Hence,
Pr(O IC0i |{x
Omin
i }) = I1− I2. (19)
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I2 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, given player i has expressed
{xOmini }. Thus,
I2 = Pr(O|{xOmini }). (20)
The construction of the product space (Ω,F ,P) ensures,
λ
x
Omin
i
(dωN\{i}) = λ
x
Omax
i
(dωN\{i}).
Therefore, I1 can be expressed as,
I1 =
∫
ωN\{i}∈ΩN\{i}
I
O(ωN\{i} × {xOmaxi }) λxOmax
i
(dωN ).
I1 is the expectation of the random variable EIO, given player i has expressed
{xOmaxi }. Hence,
I1 = Pr(O|{xOmaxi }). (21)
Substituting Equations (20) and (21) in Equation (19) yields the result.
Lemma 7.7. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O IC0i ) = Pr({x
Omin
i })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
.
Proof. Taking Lemma 7.6 and multiplying by Pr({xOmini }) gives,
Pr({xOmini })× Pr(O IC
0
i ) = Pr({x
Omin
i })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
.
Pr({xOmini } ∩O IC
0
i ) = Pr({x
Omin
i })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
.
By Definitions 6.4, 6.8, and 6.9 (O IC0i ) = ({x
Omin
i } ∩O IC
0
i ), which yields
the result.
Corollary 7.8. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i,
Pr(O TC0i ) = Pr(O) − Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }) +
Pr({xOmini })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 7.5,
Pr(O DC0i ) = Pr(O) − Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }). (22)
By Lemma 7.7,
Pr(O IC0i ) = Pr({x
Omin
i })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
. (23)
By Definition 6.6,
Pr(O TC0i ) = Pr(O DC
0
i ) + Pr(O IC
0
i ). (24)
Substituting Equations (22) and (23) in Equation (24) yields the result.
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7.3 Summary
Using measure theory, this section has shown that the criticality based voting
power measures reduce to a simple expression, involving at most three, or four,
simple probabilities: Pr(O), Pr(O|{xOmaxi }), Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }), and Pr({x
Omin
i }).
This result has been produced for the most general type of voting game possible,
with absolutely no restriction on how the game is constructed. The voting
actions of a player can include a selection from an infinite set, or it can be as
simple as voting “yes” or “no”. The decision rule of the game can range from a
simple majority, to the most complex non-monotone rule you can imagine.
To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first time that voting
power analysis has been given such a fundamental and mathematically justified
basis. We hope that these insights will inspire a renewed vigour in voting power
analysis, along the lines of the renaissance in artificial neural networks, sparked
by a similarly mathematical justification.
8 The Standard Techniques Revisited
In Section 5 we started the process of understanding the standard techniques
by showing how they can be expressed in terms of criticality functions. In the
previous section, we analysed these criticality functions in the case of our gener-
alisation of a voting game. In this section, we bring this to a logical conclusion
by providing a description of these techniques in the same probabilistic terms.
Theorem 8.1. For a GV G(Ω,F ,P,W) and a player i, the standard voting
power techniques are calculating,
ShapleyShubik = Pr({xOmini })×
(
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i })
)
.
Banzhaf = Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
Straffin = Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O|{x
Omin
i }).
Johnston = Pr(O)− Pr(O|{xOmini }).
Coleman Initiate Action =
Pr(O|{xOmaxi })− Pr(O)
1− Pr(O)
.
Coleman Prevent Action =
Pr(O)− Pr(O|{xOmini })
Pr(O)
.
Proof. In Section 5 it was shown that the standard techniques are calculating
the probability of a criticality set. Taking the results from that section, and
rephrasing them in the generalised context gives,
ShapleyShubik = Pr(O IC0). (25)
Banzhaf = Pr(O TCδ). (26)
Straffin = Pr(O TCδ). (27)
Johnston = Pr(O DC0). (28)
Coleman Initiate Action = Pr(O ICδ | O ). (29)
Coleman Prevent Action = Pr(O DCδ | O ). (30)
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Let’s examine the Coleman measures, and make them a little easier to han-
dle. By the standard rules of probability,
Coleman Initiate Action = Pr(O ICδ | O ) =
Pr(O ICδ ∩O)
Pr(O)
. (31)
Coleman Prevent Action = Pr(O DCδ | O ) =
Pr(O DCδ ∩O)
Pr(O)
. (32)
By Definitions 6.4 and 6.5
(O DCδ) = (O DCδ ∩O),
and
(O ICδ) = (O ICδ ∩O).
Replacing these terms in Equations (31) and (32), and using Pr(O) = 1− Pr(O)
gives,
Coleman Initiate Action =
Pr(O ICδ ∩O)
Pr(O)
(33)
=
Pr(O ICδ)
Pr(O)
=
Pr(O ICδ)
1− Pr(O)
.
Coleman Prevent Action =
Pr(O DCδ ∩O)
Pr(O)
=
Pr(O DCδ)
Pr(O)
. (34)
The proof is completed by using Corollary 7.4 and Lemmas 7.2, 7.3, 7.5, and
7.7, to replace terms in Equations (25), (26), (27), (28), (33), and (34).
Let’s examine this result in more familiar terms. The standard techniques
are most commonly used in voting games which can result in either a winning
or losing outcome. The previous theorem tells us that the standard techniques
are in fact calculating the following,
ShapleyShubik = Pr(Player i votes no)
× (Pr(Winning|Player i votes yes)− Pr(Winning|Player i votes no)) .
Banzhaf = Pr(Winning|Player i votes yes)− Pr(Winning|Player i votes no).
Straffin = Pr(Winning|Player i votes yes)− Pr(Winning|Player i votes no).
Johnston = Pr(Winning)− Pr(Winning|Player i votes no).
and
Coleman Initiate Action =
Pr(Winning|Player i votes yes)− Pr(Winning)
1− Pr(Winning)
.
Coleman Prevent Action =
Pr(Winning)− Pr(Winning|Player i votes no)
Pr(Winning)
.
As an unexpected bonus of our general framework the above results apply
irrespective of the number of ways in which the player can vote. Whether it be
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a simple “yes/no” game, a game with abstentions, or a choice from a contin-
uum of approval values. Moreover, all these techniques are expressed in terms
of three (or four) simple probabilities. This makes them easy to comprehend
and transparent. But perhaps, the most important consequence, is being able
to express these techniques independent of a probability model. A huge prob-
lem with the standard techniques is their requirement for a specific probability
model, making it impractical to use them in a game with a different probability
model. A drawback not faced by our measure theoretic reinterpretation.
There is one final point to note. The results of this theorem contradict the
work of Straffin. He long argued that the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf
measure were calculating the same thing, albeit with different probability mod-
els. He based his ideas upon the fact that his Homogeneity Assumption measure
was numerically equivalent to the Shapley-Shubik index. Which is true, but only
for simple “yes/no” games without abstentions. A more complex game, even
something as simple as allowing a few players to abstain, will break this numeri-
cal equivalency, and show that the Homogeneity Assumption measure is not the
same as the Shapley-Shubik index. We can see this quite easily with an example.
Imagine a game where the number of possible player actions is large, perhaps
even infinite. In such a game, it is reasonable to assume that Pr({xOmini })→ 0,
making the Shapley-Shubik index tend to zero as well. But, both the Banzhaf
measure, and the Straffin indices, will not tend to zero (unless, of course, the
player has no influence on the outcome). Therefore, the Shapley-Shubik index
is inequivalent to the Banzhaf measure and the Straffin indices.
9 Discussion
We have produced a generalised description of criticality using measure theory.
This work has brought together all the known voting power techniques under
one unifying framework. Our mathematical framework allows voting power to
be calculated in both simple and complex games, from basic “yes/no” voting,
to voting with abstentions, and even abstract non-monotone voting games with
multiple outcomes. Furthermore, our measures are constructed independent of
the underlying probability distribution of the players. This allows the use of
the correct probability model for the game in question, instead of the model
imposed arbitrarily by a voting power technique.
A huge obstacle currently faced by voting power theorists is persuading
other researchers, politicians, and the general public, how their chosen standard
technique measures voting power better than any other technique. However, in
this work, we have been able to show mathematically that these techniques are
calculating just three, or four, standard probabilities. Thus, any debate about
the superiority of one index over another is redundant. In lieu of analysing
voting power using the standard techniques, we advocate the adoption of these
probabilities. Probabilities are intuitive notions of influence, and are widely
used in every day life. Expressing voter influence in terms of probability should
lead to greater acceptance within society.
The intuitive nature of these results have an additional benefit. It makes it
easier to explain these ideas to a wider audience. The difficult task of trying to
explain to a politician what a Banzhaf measure is, or what Total Criticality δ
means, can be replaced with the easier to understand common sense approach
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to measuring total influence. For instance, a hypothetical conversation with a
politician might go something like this:
“Imagine, that you vote against a particular motion, then there is a 30%
chance of it passing. However, should you choose vote in favour, the chance of
it passing goes up to 44%. Therefore, your total voting power in this game is
44% - 30% = 14%.”
Explained this way, voting power is both obvious and easy for a layperson to
understand. And it should make it easier for institutions to adopt voting proce-
dures that respect the notions of a fair distribution of voting power. With more
and more people better able to understand voting power analysis, it will be-
come easier to create democratically fairer institutions, and ultimately improve
democracy itself.
10 Conclusion
Everyone is subject to the decisions made, or not made, by voting games.
Whether it is a decision to act on climate change by the United Nations, or
a decision to collect your waste fortnightly by the local council. Arguably, they
are one of the most influential types of game studied by game theorists.
The need to create players with unequal power in large democratic insti-
tutions is well established (for example, the E.U. Council of Ministers has a
voting game where the players represent populations of unequal size). However,
up until now, there has not been a widely accepted, mathematically justifiable,
method for measuring the power of a player in a voting game - a situation which
has impeded this research field to have its proposals adopted wholeheartedly by
large democratic institutions.
We have shown that all voting power measures based on the concept of
criticality can be reduced to a simple set of probabilistic expressions. Analysing
voting games using just these simple probabilities brings important advantages
over the status quo of the standard techniques. First, it allows the results to be
presented to, and understood by, a much wider range of people. Second, it ends
the debate over the superiority of one technique over another. And third, these
probabilities can be calculated for any voting game, irrespective of probability
model (unlike the standard techniques).
Crucially, our results apply to all possible voting games; from the simple
“yes/no” voting games to the abstract ones with non-monotone decision rules
and multiple candidates. As such, we feel that our paper provides the necessary
mathematical tools to help build better democracies.
A The Deegan-Packel, and Holler Public Good
Indices
All the results given in this paper so far have been applicable to any type of
game. Unfortunately, the Deegan-Packel, and the Holler Public Good indices
rely upon a concept called a minimum winning coalition (a minimum winning
event). These indices can only be applied to games with monotonic decision
rules. As this restricts the type of games for which they can be applied, a
discussion of these indices has been put off up until now.
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While the upcoming results can be understood without an understanding of
monotonic decision rules, for completeness, they will be briefly explained.
A.1 Monotonic Decision Rules
A monotonic decision rule induces an order upon the elements of Xi, such that,
if W(wN\{i} × xi) = O, thenW(w
N\{i} × x′i) = O, for all x
′
i
O
≥ xi.
This order allows us to define a minimum winning event as an event which is
classified as outcome O, but is no longer classified as O when any of the players
replace their current action with an action immediately below, with respect to
the order induced upon them.
If you think about this is terms of a simple “yes/no” game, a minimum win-
ning coalition is a winning coalition in which every redundant player is removed;
to leave only those necessary for the coalition to remain winning.
A.2 The Indices
The [5], and [8] indices are incredibly similar. Both indices can be described by
the following.
1. Examine every minimum winning event.
2. Identify if it is decreasingly critical delta for player i.
3. If so, add 1 (for Holler), or a fraction of 1 (for Deegan-Packel) to a running
count for player i.
4. Repeat until all minimum winning events have been examined.
In the Deegan-Packel index, the fraction that is added is a function of ωN
only, hence it can be absorbed within the Pr(dω) function of the game. In
other words, both the Deegan-Packel and Holler Public Good indices are the
same, albeit with slightly different probability models. The actual fraction that
is added in the Deegan-Packel index is inversely proportional to the number
of players that express non-zero support in ωN . Hence, the probability model
of the Deegan-Packel index implies that events with more players expressing
non-zero support are less likely to occur.
Focusing upon the Deegan-Packel index, we note, from their paper, that
their probability model assumes that only minimum winning events (MWE)
will form. Ergo, Pr(dω) = 0 unless ω ∈ MWE. This allows the required
integration to be carried out over all possible ω (as the probability model will
ensure that only MWEs occur).
DeeganPackel =
∫
ω∈Ω
I
O DCδ (ω) Pr(dω) = Pr(O DCδ).
But, from Lemma 7.2 we already know that
Pr(O DCδ) = Pr(O) − Pr(O|{xOmini }).
Hence, these indices can be expressed with the same probabilities we previ-
ously suggested.
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